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INTRODUCTION
Volkswagen, one of the most recognized brands around the world, is known for its
engineering innovation, its iconic cars, as well as its Nazi past. In recent news, the car
company has also been receiving some media attention at its newest manufacturing
location in Chattanooga. The plant only opened in 2011, but has since been the center of a
controversy involving the United Automobile Workers, Volkswagen, and Tennessee
politicians. The UAW, which has historically worked with automobile workers employed in
northern states, attempted to unionize the Chattanooga location in February 2014, but lost
with a narrow margin. While some were pleased with the outcome of the vote, others were
not, accusing politicians of being too involved in the inner workings of the Chattanooga
location. Other critics felt that Volkswagen was biased towards the union, by allowing UAW
lobbyists to campaign directly to the employees. In July 2014 the UAW announced that they
would form a local, voluntary chapter in hopes of bringing a Workmen’s Council to the
plant. To grasp this complicated tension, we must first delve into Volkswagen’s history.
HISTORY OF VOLKSWAGEN IN GERMANY
The complicated history of Volkswagen actually began as a collaboration between
Ferdinand Porsche, a celebrated automobile designer, and Adolf Hitler, the fearsome leader
of Nazi Germany. The pair didn’t meet until 1933, but quickly after began to exchange ideas
and laid the foundation for a project they felt would revolutionize Germany’s automobile
industry. Before this could happen, however, they had to separately discover their mutual
enthusiasm for cars. Porsche began his journey into the automobile world by working for
Tatra, a Czech car company. Though he had many innovative ideas, such as an early concept
for a hybrid/electric car, Porsche was truly passionate about creating an affordable family
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car and sharing his love for the auto-world. However, the company was unable to
substantially finance Porsche’s budding projects, and he moved to Germany’s AustroDaimler (Kiley 37). Unfortunately for Porsche, WWI broke out shortly after, and the car
designer found himself creating various army vehicles to supply German troops. Following
the war, Austro-Daimler returned to making luxury cars for Germany’s wealthy and
Porsche’s plans to create a car for the working-class was pushed aside once more (Kiley
37). By 1933, Porsche was working for the Auto Union, a company that resulted in the
merge of three other business firms (Kiley 38).
Adolf Hitler’s interest in the Automobile industry grew while he served his prison
sentence in 1923. During this time, he read Henry Ford’s Autobiography, My Life and Work
and was impressed both by Ford’s efficient industrial advances, as well as his infamous
anti-Semitism (Kiley 38). Around this point in time, one out of every 4.5 Americans was a
car owner. In contrast, only one of every 49 German citizens owned a car (Kiley 37). Hitler
admired Ford’s work of bringing affordable Model Ts to America’s mass public and began
to envision a mobile Germany. Hitler believed that by providing German citizens with
affordable cars, he could increase the national pride and help solidify the Nazi movement.
Furthermore, Hitler felt that increased mobility also increased the cultural standard of
Germany and could restore Germany’s economy (König 251).
Porsche remembers his first meeting with Hitler in 1933, when he and other
members of the Auto Union approached the Führer for government assistance in order to
develop new engines and sports cars. It was at this meeting that Porsche and Hitler first
discovered their mutual interest in building an affordable, mass-produced automobile
(Kiley 38). In 1934, Hitler spoke at the Berlin Auto Show and exclaimed the importance of
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designing a “people’s car” for Germany’s citizens (Kiley 38). That same year, Hitler and
Porsche met again, in order to discuss the goals for their new, innovative design. In order to
gain Hitler’s favor, the Reichsverband der Automobileindustrie (RDA, or car manufacturer’s
association) decided to fund the project (Kiley 39). Knowing that Hitler held Porsche in
such high esteem, they signed a contract with Porsche as the head designer in June 1934
(König 254).
Hitler envisioned a small, practical car that could easily accommodate a family of
four and could obtain up to 40 mpg (Kiley 38). Likewise, Porsche thought that the car had
to be approximately 1,400 lbs, have 26 horsepower, and reach speeds up to 62mph (Kiley
38). Simply put, the car had to compliment Germany’s new Autobahn infrastructure.
Porsche believed that the production costs of such a vehicle would be approximately $620
US, but Hitler wanted the cost much lower –$320 US (Kiley 39). According to Konig, Hitler
publically announced a price of 1000DM (254). Despite his reasonable doubts about the
price, and likely to avoid conflict with Hitler, Porsche continued to pursue their jointproject and began designs for a few prototypes. Hitler was pleased in 1934 when he stated,
“I am happy that due to the abilities of the superb designer Herr Porsche and his staff we
have succeeded in completing preliminary designs for a German people’s car. It must be
possible to make the German people a gift of a motor vehicle which will not cost them more
than they have heretofore been accustomed to paying for a medium priced motorcycle and
whose gas consumption will be low” (Kiley 39).
On the surface, it certainly seemed as though Porsche was finally on his way to
designing an affordable working-class car. However, Porsche continued to have hesitations
about meeting Hitler’s proposed price. In fact, by 1936 Porsche and his team had spent a
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total of 1.75 DM and only created 3 failed prototypes (König 254). It wasn’t until the
director from Adam Opel Company, Wilheim von Opel, insulted Porsche by calling his task
“impossible”, that Porsche fully reinvested himself into Hitler’s vision (Kiley 40). In 1936,
he decided to visit America’s Auto-Capital in Detroit (Kiley 39). Porsche was impressed
with the structure of Ford’s manufacturing plant, as well as the social interactions of the
site-workers. Without a doubt, the assembly line was vastly different than the auto
factories in Europe. Porsche knew that he would have to revolutionize how German auto
plants manufactured if the “people’s car” were to reach Hitler’s goal price.
By 1937 Porsche and his team still had not reached an operable prototype that was
only $320 US (Kiley 41). Both Hitler and Porsche were becoming increasingly frustrated
with the slow progress. This same year, Hitler attended the Berlin Auto show and was
flabbergasted that the Adam Opel company was promoting a new model “for the little man”
at approximately $582 US. Wilheim von Opel, the same director that had previously
insulted Porsche, proudly presented his “Volkswagen” to the Führer, but Hitler was enraged
(Kiley 42). Kiley suggests that the reason for Hitler’s rage is that he had not been directly
consulted in von Opel’s project, nor did von Opel design a suitable car for the masses (42).
Furthermore, it is important to note that the Adam Opel Company was under management
from General Motors (König 250). Though Hitler admired the U.S. auto industry, surely the
Fuhrer was not pleased that Americans were besting him.
In May 1937, the RDA was no longer capable of running the Volkswagen project and
Hitler appointed the DAF, or German labor front, in charge (König 255). Shortly after, the
Nazi party established the Volkswagen Development Company in order to thoroughly
invest in Hitler’s Volksauto vision. They decided to locate the company in present-day
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Wolfsburg, though at the time the city was known as KdF-Stadt (Nelson 81). In 1938 Hitler
laid the cornerstone on the site and officially named the Volkswagen car the KdF-Wagen
(Nelson 77). To gain interest in the car, the DAF specifically promoted the car through its
Kraft durch Freude (Strength through Joy) department (König 258). This department was
specially in charge of organizing free-time activities and vacations for the German public
(König 258). The Nazis wanted German citizens to see the people’s car as a mode of leisure
and pleasure. After the Volkswagen Development Company was established, Porsche
finally received direct investments from the government, rather than through the RDA.
To raise money for the KdF-Wagen, the DAF created an investment system for the
Volkswagen in the fall of 1938. Through this program, Germans could contribute 5 DM on a
weekly basis for approximately 4.5 years, in order to save up for their own Volkswagen
(König 257). Through the combination of consumer investments and government finances,
over $60.2 million US was used for funding the German people’s car by 1939 (Kiley 42).
Despite the abundant resources, Porsche felt that the best, most economical way to
manufacture the car was on Ford-style assembly lines. However, German manufacturing
plants had yet to adopt this method of building cars and Porsche was convinced that he
needed to recruit American workers to his factory. In the summer of 1937, he visited the
U.S. and the Ford factory once more, and managed to recruit 20+ Americans to work in the
Volkswagen plant (Kiley 45). Many of the workers had previously worked for Ford or
General Motors (König 257). Additionally, some of these workers were decedents of
German nationals. Now armed with experienced workers, clear management, stable
funding, and a factory, Porsche was ready to produce the Volkswagen for the German
public.
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However, Porsche’s progress was once again short-lived as Nazi Germany attacked
Poland in the fall of 1939. The Volkswagen factory was semi-converted into a war
manufacturing plant producing bombs, parts for airplanes, and a military version of the
Volkswagen prototype (König 256). In 1941, the production-line was finally operable and
the factory was producing a variety of military “Kubelwagens”, including Type 82, Type 86,
and Type 87 models (Kiley 53). Though these were similar in design to the KdF-Wagen
Type 1, none of these models were intended for civilian use. Military personnel who drove
Kubelwagens quickly grew to love them for their dependability in harsh conditions, fuel
efficiency, and wide range of military adaptations. By the end of the war, the Volkswagen
factory had produced over 50,000 military Kubelwagens (Kiley 55).
Because so many young German men were needed for the Nazi front, the majority of
the factory’s laborers were slaves, who had been captured as prisoners of war or recruited
from concentration camps (Volkswagenwerk 81). The VW plant engineer, Arthur Schmiele,
traveled to Auschwitz and hand-selected 300 laborers to bring back to KdF-Stadt in 1944
(Volkswagenwerk 88). Over 11,000 workers in the factory were foreign slave-laborers
(Kiley 56). Astonishingly, only 1 of every 8 of the factory’s workers was even German (Kiley
55). Italians were a large portion of the workers, provided by Mussolini a contract-like
agreement between himself and Hitler (Kiley 52). The conditions that the forced-laborers
endured at the factory were atrocious. According to Kiley, workers lived amongst liceriddled rodents, disease carrying fleas, cockroaches, and other insects (56).
Following the war, Porsche was arrested by French Authorities in 1945 and charged
as a war criminal (Kiley 57). Porsche was released in 1947, after his son paid his bail, and
died in 1951 at the age of 75. By the summer of 1945, the Volkswagen factory was heavily
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damaged and under the control of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME), a
branch of the British Military (Kiley 59). Surprisingly, many of the workers stayed at the
factory and continued building cars by hand. In 1945, they had managed to build over
1,700 KdF-Wagens. A portion of the factory was missing its roof (Sandbrook 2013) and
water frequently flooded the factory floor as they worked (Kiley 60). Kiley suggests that the
laborers continued to build cars and supply them for their British occupiers in exchange for
food and supplies (61). The factory workers also assisted in repairing some British Military
vehicles. Despite the workers’ efforts, REME planned to dismantle the manufacturing plant.
However, Major Ivan Hirst became fascinated with the KdF-Wagen and encouraged
his superiors to save the factory (Sandbrook 2013). In fact, Hirst was so taken by the design,
that he sent a KdF-Wagen to Great Britain in hopes that his superiors would take-on the
permanent management of the factory and produce the cars (Kiley 60). Hirst also felt it
necessary that the Germans were given an opportunity to rebuild their livelihoods
(Sandbrook 2013). Hirst was so passionate about his project that Mike Hocke, his driver,
recalls the major remarking, “This factory belongs to the German people, and I am here to
see they get it” (Nelson 102). While initially hesitant, British and American occupying
forces allowed the Reichsbank in Braunschweig to loan funds to the factory in 1946 (Kiley
63). This same year, the factory would produce almost 10,000 vehicles under the direction
of Hirst and rename its town Wolfsburg (Kiley 61).
In 1948 Heinz Nordhoff arrived at the factory and was also impressed by its
resilience. Nordhoff had formerly been on the Board of Directors for the Adam Opel
Company but was unable to resume his post following the war. Because of Nordhoff’s
extensive knowledge in the automobile industry, Hirst and his military superiors appointed
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the German as the new head manager of the factory. Nordhoff accepted the position and
began calling his fellow workers “partners” (Kiley 65). The same year, Nordhoff met with
Ford executives in hopes of assimilating into the American car company but was met with
harsh resistance. One executive, Ernest Breech, famously turned to Henry Ford II and
stated that he didn’t think Volkswagen was “worth a damn” (Nelson 4).
Still, Nordhoff believed in the Volkswagen factory and its product. In 1949,
Volkswagen was the only operating German car manufacturer, and was gaining market
share across Western Europe (Kiley 68). He encouraged a sense of pride within the factory
workers by respecting them as genuine stakeholders and compensating them with a higher
wage than most German jobs available at the time (Kiley 68). The popularity of the car, now
known as the Beetle, was growing and in 1958, only 10 years after being occupied by
British forces, the factory produced almost 280, 000 vehicles (Kiley 71). Without a doubt,
Volkswagen was on its way to becoming the German car giant we are so familiar with today.
In the 1950s, the West German government realized that the road to economic
success required the assistance of outside forces. Therefore in 1955, Germany made a
treaty with Italy to allow Gastarbeiter (guest workers) into the country in order to boost
labor production (Martin 35). Shortly after, Germany drafted treaties with other countries
including Turkey, Spain, Greece, and Yugoslavia (Martin 35). Volkswagen, was amongst
companies that greatly benefited from this new policy. In 1961, Volkswagen, with the
assistance of the Vatican, began recruiting Gastarbeiter to work in Wolfsburg (von Oswald
57). By 1966 that nearly 6,000 workers had arrived (von Oswald 58). The majority of these
Volkswagen guest workers were Italian (von Oswald 60).
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HISTORY OF VOLKSWAGEN IN AMERICA
Despite discouragement from Ford executives, Nordhoff still strived to enter the US
market. In January 1949, Nordhoff succeeded in importing the first iconic Beetle onto US
soil (VWGoA “The Volkswagen Beetle”). Today, the Beetle is celebrating its 65th year in the
USA. In order to expand the exportation process to the USA, Nordhoff sent a former
colleague, Geoffery Lange, to recruit American distributors. Lange succeeded in finding
over 10 enthusiastic distributors (Kiley 76). Truly establishing ground in the US was
another matter. Nordhoff knew that in order to be successful, Volkswagen had to offer
specialized dealerships and provide on-site repairs by trained Volkswagen professionals. In
1955, Volkswagen Group of America (VWGoA) was established and became the only
authorized importer of Volkswagen’s cars (Kiley 77). One year later, Germans from
Wolfsburg were recruited, much like Porsche’s American recruits two decades earlier, to
train car mechanics and create proper Volkswagen service shops (Kiley 77). In 1958, Carl
Hahn was appointed the President of VWGoA (Kiley 84).
However, the Beetle was met with significant backlash from US reporters when it
initially arrived. The Beetle was ridiculed for being ugly, out-of-date, and for having
significant history with the Nazi regime. While the latter point of criticism was certainly
true, Nordhoff, Hahn, and their fellow executives made great strides in rebranding, as well
as streamlining the Volkswagen image. In 1959 Nordhoff and Hahn, with the assistance of
the Doyle Dane Bernbach (DDB) advertisement agency launched a new campaign for
VWGoA that aimed at being transparent and honest (Kiley 85). Unlike other car ads of the
time, VW and DDB decided to use actual photographs of the Beetle, not cartoon renditions.
Additionally, the ads focused on facts about the Beetle, such as how the engine doesn’t
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require anti-freeze, how the cars run on only 5 pints of oil, how the cars went through
rigorous inspection processes, and how the Beetle was painted with a rust-inhibiting
process, not catchy slogans (Nelson 174g). Furthermore, each ad only focused on one idea,
so that consumers wouldn’t become overwhelmed with information (Kiley 89). Due to a
combination of repaired US and West-German political relations, honest advertising, and
Volkswagen’s unique car-shape, the Beetle began spreading into the hearts of Americans.
United Automobile Workers
According to the United Auto Workers website, the union was founded on Aug. 26th,
1935 and elected Francis Dillon as its first president. Since then, the UAW has represented
over 1 million active and retired employees of Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, Mitsubishi,
Volvo, and other various companies. Over 600 local UAW unions are currently in operation
throughout the U.S., Canada, and Puerto Rico (UAW “Who we Are”). Though at its peak in
1979 the UAW represented 1.5 million active members, the current active membership is
about 380,000 (Pare “UAW’s Chattanooga”).
As reported by Robert Underwood, an associate professor at Furman University,
every automotive plant investment that entered the US over the past 25 years has been
located in Southern of Midwestern states, including Tennessee (466). These states are
attractive to foreign investors, such as Volkswagen, because of an abundance of affordable
land, relatively lower utility costs, a decreased cost of living, and a large pool of skilled,
potential employees, that previously labored in the textile industry (now displaced mainly
to overseas countries)(Underwood 468). Additionally, southern states have aggressive
“Right-To-Work” laws, and fewer laborers are members of a union than in the north.
Because of this, many companies have been attracted to the southern region. Regardless, as
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the auto industry has expanded into the south, the United Automobile Workers union has
quickly tried to follow. The union has attempted to unionize the Nissan plant in Smyrna, TN,
and is currently trying to organize workers at the Mercedes-Benz plant in Vance, AL, as
well at the Volkswagen plant in Chattanooga, TN.
COMING TO CHATTANOOGA
In July 2008, VWGoA announced in a press release that they would build a new
manufacturing plant in Chattanooga, TN. The former President and CEO of VWGoA, Stefan
Jacoby stated, “Chattanooga is an excellent fit for the Volkswagen culture, having an
exceptional quality of life and a long manufacturing tradition” (VWGoA “VWGoA
announces”). Ron Littlefield, the former Chattanooga Mayor echoed his thoughts, “Both
[Chattanooga and VW] are serious about environmental sustainability and 21st Century
manufacturing” (VWGoA “VWGoA announces”). It appeared to be a perfect match. The
plant opened in 2011 and currently has over 3,200 direct employees and operates with
over 9,500 indirect employees and suppliers (VWGoA “Chattanooga Facts”). The company
made an initial investment of $1 billion to open the location, but expects an economic
impact for TN to be $12 billion (Underwood 469). Furthermore, the plant should contribute
$566.8 million annually to the state’s economy through tax revenue and income
(Underwood 469). At the present time, the Chattanooga location is the only VW
manufacturing plant in the USA, and only one of two VW plants in North America.
Additionally, Chattanooga is VWGoA’s first manufacturing plant in the United States since
1988, when it’s previous Pennsylvania location was shutdown (Ramsey).
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CONFLICT
In a recent interview with Michael Horn, the President and CEO of Volkswagen
Group of America, breaks down Volkswagen’s “Strategy 2018” into 4 distinct goals (Vater
9). They follow:
1. To become the world leader in customer satisfaction and quality
2. To have long-term return on sales before tax of at least 8 percent to ensure that
the groups position and ability to act are guaranteed even in difficult market periods
3. To be the most attractive employer in the automotive industry by 2018
4. To increase unit sales to more than 10 millions vehicles a year by 2018
The third goal of “Strategy 2018” is particularly important, as Horn states, “To build the
best vehicles, we need the best team in the sector” (Vater 9). According to the Wall Street
Journal, Volkswagen is trying to attract “the best team” to Chattanooga by compensating its
new-hires at approximately $27.00/hour, combining hourly wages and benefits (Ramsey).
Over a period of 36 months, the employee’s wage is raised up to $38.00/hour, including
wages and benefits (Ramsey). The benefits package that VW Chattanooga employees
receive includes two retirement plans, dental insurance, health insurance, and discounted
lease rates on VW automobiles (McMorris). While the pay is less than car companies
located in Detroit, such as General Motors or Ford, the compensation is high considering
the relatively low cost of living around Chattanooga.
Volkswagen also strives to be an attractive employer by creating an inviting
company culture and taking its employees into consideration. Volkswagen, and the German
auto industry in general, has a long history of successful works councils. A works council is
an organized board of blue-collar and white-collar workers that are elected from within the
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company, by their fellow-workers. On behalf of their peers, the council then attends
meetings with the company’s management in order to discuss production, labor rules,
working conditions, safety, and other opinions. Unlike a traditional union, the members of a
works council are also given access to privy financial information of the company. As
DePillis, a journalist for the Washington Post notes, works councils in Germany actually
helped prevent mass lay-offs within their companies during the recession (DePillis “Why
Volkswagen is helping”). Because they understood the potential consequences of the
recession, the members on works councils were sympathetic to their company and helped
organize schedules with reduced hours, rather than firing employees (DePillis “Why
Volkswagen is helping”). Currently the Volkswagen’s Chattanooga plant is the only VW
location in the world without any type of formal labor representation (UAW “The Works
Council”).
In an effort to change that, the United Auto Workers union began its Chattanooga
campaign in March 2013 by collecting signatures from hourly employees. In August,
representatives of UAW and VW met in Wolfsburg, Germany to further discuss the
possibility of establishing a works council (Greenhouse). By September 2013, the UAW
reported that it had received enough card signatures in favor of implementing a union in
Chattanooga. However, opposition followed shortly after, and an anti-UAW workers group
turned their own petition of 563 signatures into VW management to demonstrate that the
UAW supporters were not a clear majority. Furthermore, Tennessee Politicians Bob Corker
and Bill Haslam frequently voiced their negative opinions of VW unionizing its workers in
collaboration with the UAW.
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In early February the UAW announced that a vote would take place later in the
month. Additionally, the UAW signed a neutrality agreement that stated if the voting was
unsuccessful, than the UAW had to cease all campaign efforts for one year, nor could they
request another election for a year’s time (Pare “Claude Ramsey urges”). As a part of this
neutrality agreement, management at VW was also expected to remain impartial prior to
the elections (McMorris). On February 14, 2014, UAW held a secret-ballot in order to
officially organize the employees at the new plant. Though very confident prior to the ballot,
the UAW lost the vote with 712 workers voting “no” and 626 employees voting “yes”
(DePillis “Volkswagen Workers”).
In the days following the loss, the UAW appealed to the National Labor Relations
Board, stating that outside interference, mainly from Tennessee’s politicians, had caused an
unfair and biased sway in the vote (UAW “UAW appeals”). The appeal stated that these
politicians and other anti-union organizations threatened to withhold state-incentives (up
to $300 million) if the location was successfully unionized or if VW did not bring new SUV
production to the plant (Pare “Claude Ramsey urges”). Bob King, the current president of
the UAW, remarked:
It’s an outrage that politically motivated third parties threatened the economic
future of this facility and the opportunity for workers to create a successful
operating model that that would grow jobs in Tennessee… We’re committed to
standing with the Volkswagen workers to ensure that their right to have a fair vote
without coercion and interference is protected (UAW “UAW appeals).
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However, the UAW abruptly withdrew their appeal from the NLRB in April 2014 and a
NLRB judge, Melissa Olivero simply stated that the NLRB would uphold the election votes
(Pare “Claude Ramsey urges”).
Since then, the UAW has been trying to reorganize and continue the pursuance of a
works council more similar to the German model. Only 5 months after this decision, the
UAW aggressively began their union campaign once more, despite signing the earlier
neutrality agreement (McMorris). Additionally, Volkswagen executives did not protest at
the renewed effort. In July, a voluntary chapter of the UAW was founded that did not yet
require any dues (McMorris). The UAW hoped that enough workers would voluntarily sign
up for the chapter on their own. By November, the UAW announced once again that they
had collected enough cards to constitute a majority of the workers at the Chattanooga plant
(Schelzig “VW plant’s works council”). Also in Mid-November, VW management in
Chattanooga announced a new policy, known as “Community Organization Engagement,”
that would recognize any labor representation that received the support of at least 45% of
eligible employees (Schelzig “VW Policy”). Additionally, this number would have to be
supported by an external audit (Shepardson). Following this announcement, many antiunion groups also attempted to gain the support of the plant workers (Shepardson).
Following the announcement, Tennessee politicians once again urged for a secret ballot to
take place (Schelzig “VW plant’s works council).
ARGUMENTS FOR UNIONIZING
Under section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, also known as the
Wagner Act, companies may not form their own unions (US Gov. NLRA). Instead, if a
company wishes to have labor representation, such as a company works council, a third
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party union must first organize the employees (US Gov. NLRA). This Act has technicality
has strengthened the UAW’s campaign to organize the Chattanooga plant. In order to
uphold its own company values and culture of employee representation, Volkswagen has
taken a relatively positive stance for the UAW, even allowing UAW representatives to speak
directly with the employees, in hopes that a works council may be established. One
Chattanooga employee, Chris Brown, is happy that VW is pushing for a works council. He
stated, “My company is freely offering me voting rights…Why would I turn that down? They
want my voice (DePillis “Volkswagen workers”).
Formal labor representations, in the form of works councils, prove to be very
effective for German companies. As stated previously, works councils can actually help topmanagement with decisions concerning recessions and cutting labor costs. Paul C. Weiler, a
labor law scholar at Harvard University, interviewed management executives from
companies with works councils in the 1990s (DePillis “Why Volkswagen is helping). Weiler
reported three main advantages for having employees represented on works councils
(DePillis “Why Volkswagen is helping”):
1. Management must think of every decision and it’s effects on the employee
force in advance.
2. Because they consist of employee members, works councils are more
sympathetic to the well-being of the company than a third-party labor union.
3. Works councils help implement decisions from management in an effective,
smooth manner.
Another benefit of works councils compared to traditional trade unions, is that
works councils are typically not permitted to strike, nor would they be likely to (DePillis
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“Why Volkswagen is helping”). Because works councils work with management, both
parties generally would come to an agreement before the conflict escalates to such drastic
measure as a strike. Organizing a union may also help protect workers from work
grievances, benefits, and seniority issues (Pare “UAW’s Chattanooga”). Though unions
traditionally helped employees gain better wages and work hours, these are not necessarily
“key-issues” any longer. Rather, job security tends to be a priority for laborers, as a prounion Chattanooga resident, Roger Thompson, points out (Pare “UAW’s Chattanooga”).
Unions can help shield employees from such issues.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST UNIONIZING
Those opposed to unionizing recall Volkswagen’s failed plant in Westmoreland
County, PA. Volkswagen purchased the location, which had previously been a Chrysler
manufacturing plant, in 1978. The company inherited the employees, whom were
organized by the United Automobile Workers, when it began its operation. Within 6
months, the UAW-represented employees went on strike against Volkswagen (Pare “UAW’s
Chattanooga”). The plant only managed to operate for 10 years before finally shutting
down in 1988. Many suggest that the union was a large part of the blame (Pare “UAW’s
Chattanooga”).
Another argument against unionizing is that the Chattanooga location already
supplies great benefits to its employees. Former Deputy Governor Claude Ramsey, who was
a key politician in attracting VW to the Chattanooga area, notes that the hourly employees
at the Chattanooga plant have “good jobs, with good working conditions, good benefits, and
good pay” (Pare “Claude Ramsey urges”). He then asks, “Why would they choose to change?
Why pay dues for something you already have? What is the real benefit of a union?” (Pare
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“Claude Ramsey urges”). In fact, some Volkswagen employees voiced that opinion
themselves.
Others are afraid that bringing the UAW to the Chattanooga plant will detract other
potential employers from expanding into surrounding areas. Tennessee Politicians, such as
Governor Bill Haslam and Senator Bob Corker, are amongst those who are fearful that
unionizing will harm other investments in Tennessee (Greenhouse) (Pare “UAW’s
Chattanooga”). While the works council is supposed to connect employees with managers,
some are afraid that unionizing the plant would actually harm their relationships. If
unionized, then VW employees would no longer have the freedom to approach their
management team about concerns without the presence of a UAW representative. This is
more inline with the bargaining power used by trade unions, and not the collaboration
methods that a works council strives for.
Many opponents to unionizing are hesitant to join the UAW because of membership
dues. Mike Burton, a VW Chattanooga employee for 3 years, explains “a large portion of
dues goes to the strike fund. A fund that is regularly dipped into for their [UAW’s] operating
and recruiting expenses. Who would want to be affiliated with leadership like that?”
(McMorris).
ANALYSIS
It’s important to note that while the Volkswagen Chattanooga workers voted against
unionizing with the UAW this past February, they have remained are extremely interested
in forming a works council. Burton stated in his interview, “We want an organization that
would represent us, but it’s clear they [UAW] were already on board with [VW]
management” (McMorris). Unfortunately, it certainly seems as though neither the union-
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supporters, nor the union-opponents played fair during the issue, or took the workers’
February decision into serious consideration. Volkswagen appeared to provide a very
biased mouthpiece for the United Auto Workers, allowing them to campaign within the
building by providing pamphlets, hosting meetings, and approaching workers for
signatures of support. Furthermore, the German trade union that represents Volkswagen’s
workers in Germany, IG Metall, has implored the Chattanooga plant to officially recognize
the UAW and not to make agreements with other unions (Schelzig “VW Policy”). However,
Volkswagen did not allow similar opportunities for other unions to speak to the
Chattanooga force, nor did they permit anti-union organizations to campaign within the
building, even though VW employees seeking alternate routes to a works council had
directly formed many of these groups.
It is especially troublesome that VW did not reprimand the United Auto Workers for
clearly breaking the neutrality agreement and resuming its campaign mere months after
the workers had participated in their secret ballot. In fact, Volkswagen also broke the
neutrality agreement by favoring the UAW over other campaigns. The obvious favoritism
suggests that VW plans to override the wishes of its workers. Volkswagen is therefore
going against the very idea of listening to its employees through a works council and is
instead playing the role of an overbearing, controlling parent.
The United Auto Workers accused Senator Corker and Governor Haslam of gross
misconduct, interference, and intimidation to sway the ballot in February. Prior to the vote,
the UAW was confident that they possessed the support of over 50% of the plant
employees, based on collected cards and signatures. However, when the results were
counted 53% of the employees voted against organizing with the UAW. If anything, this can
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also speak towards the power of intimidation. The UAW collected cards throughout their
campaign on a personal, not anonymous, basis. The workers easily may have felt pressured
into signing their support. This does not suggest that the employees were fully informed on
the matter yet, but rather felt like they had to sign at that moment. When the time to vote
arrived, these employees may have cast a new vote under the stress-free procedures of a
secret ballot.
The anti-union side also engaged in some questionable practices. Senator Corker’s
and Governor Haslam’s opinions, as well as financial purses, definitely may have affected
the outcome. Considering that the South has a long history of uncertain job security, the
prospect of adding an SUV production line to the plant, as well as establishing an additional
2,000 jobs, would be extremely appealing to the Volkswagen employees. This would most
certainly establish job security for those already at the plant. Furthermore, the $300 million
incentive may have changed the minds of a few pro-UAW sympathizers. As was previously
stated, this would help expand the plant and create more job security. While the politicians
should not have been engaging in the affairs of a private business, their vocal opinions were
probably less intimidating than the constant presence of the United Auto Workers
representatives in the Volkswagen plant. In an interview with a Chattanooga plant
employee, Mike Burton, he reported that VW management provided office space for the
UAW during their campaign, and that the UAW were free to network with employees
during lunch breaks (McMorris).
In response to the UAW’s continued campaign, some VW employees decided to
found their own “grass-roots” union. The American Council of Employees, also known as
ACE, was founded in September 2014 by Chattanooga workers to represent themselves
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(DePillis “The strange case”). The group’s current president, Sean Moss, insists that
workers must have a right to be heard, but doesn’t think that the UAW is the appropriate
choice for Chattanooga. He describes how he perceives the UAW, “I saw mismanagement, I
saw malfeasance, I saw cronyism, I saw nepotism. Just looking at their membership
numbers, the way they’ve declined since 2002. Job security? Well, you can’t give me that.
And when I look at our wages compared with the big three, we’re doing better, so you can’t
give me a raise” (DePillis “The strange case”).
CONCLUSION
On December 8th, 2014 Volkswagen announced that after an external audit was
conducted, the United Auto Workers had successfully gained at least 45% of the laborers’
support in Chattanooga (Shepardson). VW gave the UAW expanded rights within the
location. With these new access rights, the Chattanooga chapter will attend bi-weekly
meetings with the HR department within Chattanooga. The UAW will also attend a meeting
with the VW Chattanooga executive committee once a month (Shepardson). Though the
UAW has “won” in many ways, this still doesn’t permit them sole representation of the
Chattanooga members, nor are they able to bargain wage and other worker’s rights with
the company (Shepardson).
Despite Volkswagen’s most recent announcement, the method of how the
Chattanooga employees are represented remains largely uncertain. Neither the UAW nor
Volkswagen released the official support percentage of Chattanooga employees towards
the union. Assuming the United Auto Workers received 45-55% support of the eligible
employees, other unions or anti-union groups can continue to campaign to be a
representative of the employees as well. Based on their “Community Organization
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Engagement” from November, Volkswagen Chattanooga will give any group that receives
45% support monthly access to their executive meetings.
There could also be backlash about VW favoring the UAW over other labor groups.
Already, the American Council of Employees plans to take legal action against the UAW
(Pare “ACE says”). They organization feels that it didn’t receive adequate consideration
from Volkswagen management (Pare “ACE says”). Furthermore, ACE accuses the UAW of
including outdated signatures in their support-statistics (Pare “ACE says”). Some justifiably
might feel that Volkswagen’s November announcement and the UAW’s November
declaration of their majority of the workers’ support was not sheer coincidence.
A works council, in which every employee is represented and is actually valued by
management, is a truly progressive notion within the corporate culture of the United States.
It would ensure that employees could directly speak to their employers about concerns,
and employers could reach out for feedback and input during critical times. It stands in
huge contrast to the traditional trade union, where employees can only negotiate with
employers if outside representation present, and employers dread the constant demands.
Just as the Heinz Nordhoff saw the value of calling his employees “partners,” Volkswagen
sees the value of listening to their employees and working with them to create a better and
happier work environment. While VW’s intentions to create a works council may be pure,
some employees are wary of the methods that VW and the UAW have taken to do so.
Unfortunately, this may weaken the very trust that VW aims to build between themselves
and their Chattanooga employees.
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